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We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
T. S. Eliot1
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 21, 1969, at the dawn of the modern environmental era,
a young lawyer and legislator from Sunbury named Franklin Kury
* John C. Dernbach is Distinguished Professor of Law at Widener University, Com-
monwealth Law School, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and director of the Environmental Law
and Sustainability Center. He is former policy director of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection. Ed Sonnenberg provided helpful research assistance. Professor
Dernbach can be reached at jcdernbach@widener.edu.
** Marc Prokopchak is a member of the Class of 2016 at Widener University, Common-
wealth Law School.
1. T. S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 39 (1943).
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introduced what would become the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment to the Pennsylvania Constitution (the "Amendment"). He
said:
Mister Speaker, I rise to introduce a natural resource conser-
vation amendment to Pennsylvania's Bill Of Rights. I do so
because I believe that the protection of the air we breathe, the
water we drink, the esthetic qualities of our environment, has
now become as vital to the good life-indeed to life itself-as
the protection of those fundamental political rights, freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, of peaceful
assembly and privacy. 2
Representative Kury was well aware of Pennsylvania's history of
environmental exploitation in the name of economic development,
and the human and natural costs that accompanied it. He wanted
the Amendment to foster a consistent statewide policy regarding
the environment. "We need a state government policy that is
clearly stated and beyond question, one that will firmly guide the
legislature, the executive, and the courts alike. ' 3 He consistently
explained the Amendment as needed to address existing and future
environmental threats.4
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, amendments must be ap-
proved by each house of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in two
successive legislative sessions, and then approved by a majority of
voters in a public referendum. 5 Both houses of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly approved the amendment in the 1969-70 and
1971-72 legislative sessions. 6 Then, in a referendum vote on May
18, 1971, the public approved it by a margin of four to one.7
Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
2. H. JOURNAL, 1969 Reg. Sess., at 485-86 (Pa. 1969), reprinted in John C. Dernbach &
Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of Article 1, Section 27 of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in WIDENER L. J., at 6-7 (Widener Law Sch., Legal Re-
search Paper Ser. No. 14-18, 2014) (WIDENER L. J. forthcoming 2015), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id=411559 [hereinafter Dernbach & Sonnen-
berg, Legislative History].
3. Id. at 7; see also id. at 15 (similar statement).
4. E.g., id. at 66 (stating the Amendment "would go a long way toward tempering any
individual, company, or governmental body which may have an adverse impact on our natu-
ral or historic assets.").
5. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
6. Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Id.
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of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including genera-
tions yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.8
As adopted, the Amendment creates two sets of public rights.
The first sentence contains a public right to "clean air, pure water,"
and the preservation of four environmental values-"natural, sce-
nic, historic, and esthetic." The second and third sentences contain
a public right to the conservation and maintenance of "public natu-
ral resources." The government, in turn, is assigned a trustee role
on behalf of those resources, for the benefit of both present and fu-
ture generations.
The text was of great concern to the drafters. Before adopting the
Amendment, the General Assembly amended it three times because
it understood that the text mattered and it wanted to get the text
right. All three of these changes were made to the public trust part
of the Amendment. As originally introduced, the Amendment
would have required the state to protect public natural resources
"in their natural state."9 It was rather quickly amended to delete
"in their natural state."10 Another change involved the scope of
what was to be protected. As originally drafted, the Amendment
contained a list of protected resources, including "the air, waters,
fish, wildlife, and the public lands and property of the Common-
wealth."11 Because of concern in the legislature that a list would be
used to "limit, rather than expand" the range of protected resources,
the term "public natural resources" was substituted for the list.1 2
The third change involved the responsibility of the state for pro-
tected natural resources. As originally introduced, the proposal
would have required the state to "preserve and maintain" public
natural resources.1 3 The term "conserve" was substituted for "pre-
serve" at the request of Dr. Maurice Goddard, who was then Secre-
tary of the Department of Forests and Waters.1 4 He was concerned
8. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
9. H.R. 958, Printers No. 1105 (Apr. 21, 1969), in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 4-5.
10. H.R. 958, Printers No. 1307 (Apr. 29, 1969), in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 10-11.
11. H.B. 958 Printers No. 1105, supra note 9.
12. Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative History, supra note 2, at 21-22.
13. Id. at 5.
14. ROBERT BROUGHTON, ANALYSIS OF HB 958, THE PROPOSED PENNSYLVANIA
ENVIRONMENTAL DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, H. JOURNAL, 1970 Reg. Sess., at 2273 (Pa. 1970),
reprinted in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative History, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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that "preserve" might prohibit his department from authorizing
"trees to be cut on Commonwealth land" or prohibit the game com-
mission from licensing hunters to "harvest game."15
This Article is about the loss and recovery of that original mean-
ing. As Part I explains, two court decisions in the 1970s essentially
ignored the history, purpose, and text of article I, section 27. As a
result, courts tended to say that article I, section 27 applied only if
the legislature said so. When it did apply, moreover, it was not the
text of the Amendment that was employed; it was a three-part bal-
ancing test that the Commonwealth Court devised as a substitute
for the text. Part I also exhaustively describes all of the reported
judicial and administrative opinions on that balancing test. As Part
I explains, the environmental plaintiff or petitioner has almost
never succeeded. This three-part balancing test, in other words, is
not only a remarkable example of a court substituting its own rule
for that in the constitution; it has also had the effect of demonstra-
bly and significantly limiting public rights. 16
The recovery of the original meaning occurred in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's December 19, 2013 decision in Rob-
inson Township v. Commonwealth.1 7 In that case, described in Part
II, the court held unconstitutional several provisions of the State's
recently adopted Marcellus Shale gas legislation, known as Act
13.18 A plurality of the court, in a scholarly, thoughtful, and de-
tailed opinion by Chief Justice Castille, based its decision on the
text, purpose, and history of article I, section 27. Castille, who re-
tired from the court at the end of 2014, has described Robinson
Township as his legacy decision.1 9 Because this Article is part of a
tribute to the retired chief justice, Part II also describes aspects of
this opinion that are likely to give it staying power, even though it
did not command a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Whatever future courts decide about the meaning and scope of ar-
ticle I, section 27, they are likely to honor its text, purpose, and his-
tory.
We are now more than forty years into the journey that began
with the dawn of modern environmental era. In the years since
article I, section 27 was adopted, Pennsylvania has enacted a wide
15. Id.
16. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1989)
(explaining how judicial activism can be used to both enlarge and limit constitutional rights).
17. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
18. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-3504 (West 2014).
19. Matt Fair, Retiring Pa. Chief Justice Pegs Legacy on Fracking Decision, LAW360 (Dec.
19, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/606453/retiring-pa-chief-justice-pegs-legacy-on-
fracking-decision.
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variety of environmental statutes and regulations. 20 The level of
environmental sophistication and understanding-among regula-
tors, industry, the public, and policy makers-has grown enor-
mously. And yet now, thanks to Chief Justice Castille's opinion, we
are back at the beginning, getting to know article I, section 27 "as
if for the first time. '21
II. Loss OF ORIGINAL MEANING OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 27
The original understanding of article I, section 27 was lost
in two cases that were decided in the 1970s, shortly after the
Amendment was adopted. The first major case brought under arti-
cle I, section 27, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc., framed the Amendment as a grant of power to the gov-
ernment to engage in environmental regulation, not as a limit on
government authority. Because of that interpretive framework,
many subsequent courts held that the Amendment is not self-exe-
cuting; that is, it applies only if, and to the extent that, the General
Assembly says so. In the second major case, Payne v. Kassab, the
Commonwealth Court expressly substituted a three-part balancing
test for the actual text of article I, section 27-a test that has de-
monstrably proven ineffective in protecting public rights. For four
decades, those two cases effectively buried article I, section 27.
A. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc.
The first significant case under the Environmental Rights
Amendment was Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc. 22 In that case, the Attorney General sought an injunc-
tion to prevent the construction of a 307-foot observation tower on
private land just outside the Gettysburg National Military Park. 23
No state or local governmental approval was required. 24 The state
did not claim that it was attempting to conserve and maintain pub-
lic natural resources. 25 Rather, the state focused on the Amend-
ment's first sentence, arguing that the tower's visibility throughout
20. See generally PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE (Terry R. Bossert
& Joel R. Burcat, eds., 2012) (comprehensive compendium describing these statutes and reg-
ulations).
21. ELIOT, supra note 1.
22. 13 Adams County L.J. 45, 75, 135 (C.P. Adams Cnty. 1971), affd, 302 A.2d 886 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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the Gettysburg Battlefield would interfere with the experience of
park visitors, and thus interfere with the public right to preserva-
tion of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of that envi-
ronment. 26 The public's right to the preservation of those values,
the Attorney General claimed, imposed a substantive limitation on
such private development. 27 Yet article I rights are rights against
the government, not against private parties. The Attorney Gen-
eral's claim, by contrast, was that article I, section 27 worked as a
grant of authority to seek an injunction against a private developer.
The court of common pleas decided that article I, section 27 is
self-executing; that is, the people have a right to clean air, pure wa-
ter, and the preservation of certain environmental values, regard-
less of whether the legislature has enacted supporting legislation. 28
The court reasoned that other provisions in the Pennsylvania Dec-
laration of Rights have previously been held to be self-executing. 29
The common pleas court also denied the requested injunction, rul-
ing that the state "has failed to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the
Gettysburg area will be irreparably harmed by the construction of
the proposed tower on the proposed site."30 For example, the tower
was not likely to have an adverse effect on park visitors, and would
enable many visitors to get a better sense of the overall battle than
they could get from the ground.3'
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that article I, section
27 is self-executing but affirmed the denial of the injunction. 32
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Common-
wealth Court's decision, there was no majority opinion on whether
article I, section 27 is self-executing.3 3 In part, this was because of
the unusual nature of the Attorney General's claim. Two Justices
worried that article I, section 27, if self-executing, would allow the
government to challenge private activities on private land.34 Be-
cause the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was divided on the issue of
whether the Amendment is self-executing, the Commonwealth
Court's opinion is binding precedent on that issue; that is, article I,
26. See Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 588-
89 (Pa. 1973).
27. Id. at 592.
28. See Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams County L.J. at 79-80.
29. Id. (citing Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79 (1903)).
30. Id. at 86.
31. Id.
32. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973).
33. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
34. Id. at 593 (opinion of the court by Justice O'Brien, joined by Justice Pomeroy).
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section 27 is self-executing. Still, that point was often lost on sub-
sequent courts, which held that article I, section 27 does not apply
unless the General Assembly says so. 35 Because this was the first
major case brought under the Amendment, moreover, it has led law-
yers and judges to see article I, section 27 solely as a grant of gov-
ernmental authority. There is little if any hint in the case that ar-
ticle I rights, including the environmental rights delineated in sec-
tion 27, operate as a limit on governmental authority.
B. Payne v. Kassab
The second case, which tested the State's public trust responsi-
bility under article I, section 27, is Payne v. Kassab.36 In Payne,
private citizens and college students brought an original action in
the Commonwealth Court against the State, the city of Wilkes-
Barre, and certain state and city officials to prevent the widening
of a city street to a four-lane highway approximately two-thirds of
a mile in length. 37 The proposed street widening project would slice
.59 acres from the park along the project's length, slightly less than
three percent of the park's total acreage. 38 Among other things,
they argued that the park was a public natural resource, and that
the public trust part of the Amendment prevented the use of even
that small part of the park for a street-widening project.39
In response to the plaintiffs' claims that the text of article I, sec-
tion 27 imposed a limitation on the project, a defendant, the Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation, filed briefs proposing that
a three-part test be used in lieu of the constitutional text.40 The test
required nothing more of the agency than its existing statutes.41
The Commonwealth Court adopted that test as a "realistic and not
merely legalistic" means of deciding whether the Amendment has
been violated.4 2 The court stated:
35. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 488-89 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012) (dismissing claim of violation of article I, section 27 because the General Assembly
decided not to apply article I, section 27 to this type of case), rev'd, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
36. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
37. Id. at 88-89.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Twenty Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 127-28 (1990).
41. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 n.23.
42. Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
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The court's role must be to test the decision under review by a
threefold standard: (1) Was there compliance with all applica-
ble statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the
Commonwealth's public natural resources? (2) Does the record
demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental
incursion to a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm
which will result from the challenged decision or action so
clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to
proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?43
The court then applied that test to the street-widening project at
issue.44 The court first analyzed whether the state had complied
with the applicable state transportation statute, which prohibited
highway construction through public parks or historical sites unless
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land,
and unless the facility is planned and constructed to minimize the
harm to the park or historical site.45 The court concluded that the
state complied with this statute.46 In addition, the court found that
the planting of new trees, re-landscaping of the affected area, and
preservation of historic features demonstrated a reasonable effort
to minimize the project's adverse consequences. 47 The court then
balanced the improvement in traffic movement that the project
would bring against the loss of roughly three percent of the park's
land area, and decided that the benefits of the project outweighed
its costs. 48
In affirming the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme
Court recognized the plaintiffs' claim as being anchored primarily
in the public trust part of the Amendment. 49 In fact, the Supreme
Court expressly distinguished Gettysburg Tower by stating that the
"property here is public property," not private property. 50 In this
context, the Supreme Court said, the Amendment is self-executing:
"There can be no question that the Amendment itself declares and
creates a public trust of public natural resources for the benefit of
all the people (including future generations) and that the Common-
43. Id.
44. See id. at 94-96.
45. See id. at 94-95.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 95.
48. See id. at 96.
49. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272-73 (Pa. 1976).
50. Id. at 272.
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wealth is made the trustee of said resources, commanded to con-
serve and maintain them."51 The court then explained that the safe-
guards provided by the state transportation statute "vouchsafe that
a breach of the trust" established by the Amendment "will not oc-
cur" if state agencies comply with those safeguards. 52 Because the
statute "was complied with, we have no hesitation in deciding that
the appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not failed in its
duties as trustee" under article I, section 27.53 The Supreme Court
did not understand the three-part test to be an all-purpose substi-
tute for the text of the Amendment; rather, it concluded that the
test was an appropriate means in this case to ensure compliance
with the constitutional text.54 In a footnote, the Supreme Court ob-
served that the Commonwealth Court had used the test to deter-
mine compliance with the Amendment. 55
The proper role of a court in deciding cases has, of course, been
the subject of much debate. This debate centers on constitutional
interpretation and application.56 A variety of definitions of judicial
activism also exist, along with a variety of views about whether ju-
dicial activism is good or bad.57 For example, Robert Bork wrote:
"Activist judges are those who decide cases in ways that have no
plausible connection to the law they purport to be applying, or who
stretch or even contradict the meaning of that law." 8 Such judges,
however, are not simply interpreting texts or applying law in some
activist way; they are operating outside the realm of what judges
are supposed to do.59 Similarly, the Commonwealth Court's substi-
tution of a three-part balancing test for the text of article I, section
27 is not simply an activist reading of the text of the Environmental
Rights Amendment; it steps outside the realm of what judges are
supposed to do. 60
51. Id.
52. Id. at 273.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 273 n.23.
56. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III & Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Activism and Its Crit-
ics, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 112 (2006).
57. AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 263-82 (2009).
58. ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 8 (2003), cited
in BARAK, supra note 57, at 267.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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C. The Unhappy Legacy of Payne v. Kassab
Unfortunately, and with little or no judicial analysis or explana-
tion, the Payne test has come to be the "all-purpose test for applying
[a]rticle I, [s]ection 27 when there is a claim that the Amendment
itself has been violated."6 1 In using the Payne test, courts rarely
distinguish between public and private resources, between values
and resources, or between the public trust and the right to a decent
environment. Nor do cases distinguish between public-to-public
transfers of public natural resources, such as occurred in Payne v.
Kassab, with the conversion of part of a public park into a public
street, and public-to-private transfers, when public natural re-
sources are converted to private use. For four decades, the law of
article I, section 27 has been the Payne test and the cases decided
under it, and not the actual text of the Amendment.
In order to better understand the effect of Payne's three-prong
test on the judicial and administrative landscape of constitution-
ally-based environmental challenges, one of the authors (Mr. Pro-
kopchak) undertook an exhaustive review of reported court cases
and agency adjudications from 1973 to the present that have either
applied the Payne test directly, reviewed its application (or lack
thereof) by a lower court or agency, or both. The results are telling.
In the overwhelming majority of reported court cases and adminis-
trative agency proceedings, individuals or organizations seeking
vindication of their environmental rights lost.
1. Reported Court Cases
Of the twenty-four reported court cases where parties raised an
article I, section 27 challenge to some type of governmentally-ap-
proved action-for example, a permit issuance or modification, con-
demnation, or construction project-only a single case held that the
benefits of the government's action were clearly outweighed by its
environmental harm, thus failing Payne's requirements. In all
other reported cases, the court found that the three-part Payne test
was satisfied, thus complying with article I, section 27.62 The re-
ported cases are summarized in Appendix A. Beginning in 1973
and continuing to the present day, parties challenging government
action in Pennsylvania courts as violating article I, section 27 have
61. John C. Dernbach, Natural Resources and the Public Estate, in THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES § 29.3[a] (Ken Gormley et al., eds.,
2004) (quoted in Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, No. 228 M.D. 2012, 2013 WL
3942086, at *8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013)).
62. See infra Appendix A.
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faced, and continue to face, an almost insurmountable hurdle in the
Payne u. Kassab test.
Initially, as the law was developing and application of the Payne
test was still in its fledgling stages, challengers faced the difficulty
of courts and agencies applying the test in an unregimented and
unpredictable fashion. For example, in an early Court of Common
Pleas decision, the court held that the state had no affirmative duty
under article I, section 27 to assess the environmental impact of its
challenged condemnation of private property for a state road pro-
ject. 63 In another case later that year, the Commonwealth Court
held that when an article I, section 27 challenge is brought, the
agency or reviewing court must analyze the state's action to make
sure it satisfies the Payne requirements, but then upheld the utility
commission's approval of a power line construction project after per-
forming a de novo Payne analysis on the basis of the record. 64 In
Snelling v. Department of Transportation,65 the court recited the
three-prong Payne standard, but after finding a particular statute
did not apply to a disputed road modification project, the court af-
firmed approval of the project with no discussion or analysis of the
second or third Payne prongs. 66
Even as the courts began to implement Payne in a more con-
sistent fashion, the chances of succeeding on an article I, section 27-
based challenge remained almost non-existent. A typical example
of the difficulty created by Payne's standard of review is found in
Concerned Citizens for Orderly Progress u. Commonwealth, Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources.67 There, a citizens group, a town-
ship, and several private parties challenged the Department of En-
vironmental Resources' (DER) 68 issuance of a water quality permit
that would allow for the construction of a sewage system and treat-
ment plant.69 The permit also allowed the discharge of sewage ef-
fluent into a local tributary of the Allegheny Creek (and alterna-
tively, when this tributary was running low due to dry weather, a
local bog area)70
63. In re Condemnation of Right-of-Way, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 215, 225-26 (C.P. Chester
Cnty. 1975).
64. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Commonwealth, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
335 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
65. 366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
66. Id. at 1305-06.
67. 387 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
68. In 1995, the Department of Environmental Resources was renamed the Department
of Environmental Protection. See 71 PA. STAT. § 1340.50 1.
69. Concerned Citizens, 387 A.2d at 991.
70. Id.
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The challengers asserted, among other things, that the issuance
of the permit violated article I, section 27 because neither DER nor
the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB)71 made or required the
appropriate evaluation of the environmental impacts of the pro-
posed project before issuing the permit.7 2 While conceding that nei-
ther DER nor the EHB had followed Payne's mandate to balance
the project's benefits against its environmental harm (as required
by the third prong), the Commonwealth Court undertook its own
Payne analysis based on the record.7 3 The court found no statute
violated, that the EHB did not abuse its discretion in determining
that a reasonable effort had been made to keep environmental in-
cursions to a minimum, and that "the environmental impact of the
sewage plant and the resulting effluent will be negligible, while the
social and economic benefits appear to be significant."74
Szarko v. Department of Environmental Resources75 provides an-
other example of the typical result of an article I, section 27 chal-
lenge to governmental action after Payne. In Szarko, a private
landowner challenged DER's issuance of permits in 1988 and 1990
for a solid waste landfill situated adjacent to his property.76 To-
gether, the two permits allowed for ninety-five acres of expansion,
as well as fifty acres of overtopping-placement of waste over areas
on which waste had already been placed. 77
The landowner raised numerous challenges to the issuance of the
permits, including multiple alleged statutory violations, and the
fact that there were nine other landfills in the county that could
have been used in lieu of the disputed landfill he contended was
contaminating groundwater and nearby streams.78 The Common-
wealth Court made short work of the landowner's article I, section
27 challenge. In several sentences at the conclusion of the opinion,
the court noted that it found no statutory violations, and-without
any analysis of the landowner's claims of potential environmental
71. The Environmental Hearing Board is as an administrative appellate body for deci-
sions by the Department of Environmental Resources/Department of Environmental Protec-
tion. See Environmental Hearing Board Act, 35 PA. STAT. §§ 7511-16. Because the EHB
conducts de novo review of DER/DEP decisions, it was appropriate for challengers to claim
that the EHB as well as DER failed to conduct the required review. See Young v. Dep't Envtl.
Res. 600 A.2d 667, 668 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
72. Concerned Citizens, 387 A.2d at 992.
73. Id. at 994.
74. Id. at 994-95.
75. 668 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
76. Id. at 1232-33.
77. Id. at 1235.
78. Id. at 1236.
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damage contained in his appeal-simply affirmed the EHB's deter-
mination that "the benefits of the landfill outweigh the environmen-
tal harm."79
A Commonwealth Court case, Pennsylvania Environmental Man-
agement Services v. Commonwealth, Department of Environmental
Resources,80 provides an excellent example of how far removed the
Payne test is from the constitutional text. In that case, the DER
denied an application to operate a municipal waste landfill permit
because, among other things, of the applicant's failure to ade-
quately protect against the risk of a leachate discharge into a high
quality stream and of its failure to properly address truck traffic to
the proposed facility.81 The EHB upheld the Department's decision.
The Commonwealth Court reversed based on the third prong of
Payne v. Kassab. Where the Department denies a permit applica-
tion, the court said, "it follows logically" from the third prong that
the Department "abused its discretion if the benefits clearly out-
weigh the harm. '8 2 The Department erred, the Commonwealth
Court held, by looking only at the site-specific benefits of the land-
fill, not "the regionwide benefits which would result from operation
of the urgently needed landfill."8 3 A constitutional amendment in-
tended to provide citizens with environmental rights was, in this
case, used to overturn a decision protecting those rights. The ben-
efits of the landfill, which are outside the scope of the Amendment
and have no stated constitutional stature under any other provision
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, provided the justification for do-
ing so.
The solitary reported court case with an outcome favoring the
challenger is Marcon, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources.8 4 There, DER issued several permits to a real
estate developer, including a permit to allow for the discharge of
treated sewage effluent into a local high-quality stream.8 5 On ap-
peal, after the challengers established the serious and deleterious
effects the project would have on several high quality waterways,
the EHB set aside the permits as a violation of article I, section 27,
finding the issuance of the permits violated all three prongs of the
79. Id. at 1239-40.
80. 503 A.2d 477 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
81. Id. at 479.
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id.
84. 462 A.2d 969 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
85. Id. at 970.
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Payne test.8 6 The Commonwealth Court affirmed the EHB's deter-
mination, finding its decision supported by substantial evidence.8 7
Marcon remains, however, the exception rather than the rule, and
it bears noting that the court was simply affirming a decision
reached by the EHB, rather than finding in favor of the challenger
through its own analysis.
2. Administrative Agency Decisions
Challengers in administrative proceedings fared only marginally
better than those in judicial proceedings. Of the fifty-five reported
agency decisions performing a Payne analysis or review (or both),88
only eight had "favorable"8 9 outcomes for the challengers, with just
two of those eight cases actually resulting in a final agency deter-
mination that the environmental harm of the challenged action
clearly outweighed its benefits. 90 The cases are summarized in Ap-
pendix B.
Representative of typical agency decisions are EHB adjudications
like Souders & Souders v. Department of Environmental Re-
sources,91 and Township of Indiana v. Department of Environmental
Resources.92 In Souders, local landowners appealed DER's issuance
of a surface mining permit for the operation of a limestone quarry
in an agricultural area adjacent to the challengers' residential prop-
erties.93 Among the challenges raised by the landowners was that
permitting the operation of a quarry and its concomitant blasting
would damage the aesthetic value of the area.94 The EHB per-
formed a Payne analysis from the record and found all three prongs
satisfied. 95 The Board found that no statutes were violated, that
the permittee had planned to do as much as could be expected to
keep the environmental incursions of a quarrying operation to a
86. Id. at 970-71, 970 n.1.
87. Id. at 971.
88. Agency decisions utilizing the Payne test (with both favorable or unfavorable out-
comes) that were reviewed on appeal by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court are not in-
cluded in this figure, as those decisions are incorporated into the analysis of the reported
court cases.
89. A "favorable" decision includes-in addition to a final agency determination that the
environmental harm of the challenged action clearly outweighed its benefits-remanding for
a failure to apply the Payne test properly, remanding or reversing for failing one or more of
the Payne prongs, reversing a permit modification for failure to apply the Payne test, and
modifying a permit to better comport with the second prong of the Payne test.
90. See infra Appendix B.
91. 1975 E.H.B. 21 (Pa.).
92. 1984 E.H.B. 1 (Pa.).
93. Souders, 1975 E.H.B. at 21.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 25-26.
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minimum, and that the "reasonably expected" benefits of the
quarry-as no actual benefits were included in the record-were
not clearly outweighed by the environmental harm. 96
In Township of Indiana, a citizens group and township chal-
lenged DER's approval for the construction of a facility to process
"fly ash, bottom ash, and pyritic material" (by-products of coal burn-
ing power plants) in a small community on the outskirts of Pitts-
burgh. 97 The challengers raised concerns about increased truck
traffic, health risks, and the adverse environmental impact of the
facility, claiming DER's issuance of the permit violated article I,
section 27.98 The Board, after performing a full Payne analysis, af-
firmed DER's approval and concluded that the challengers had
failed to show that any of the Payne prongs had not been satisfied. 99
Conversely, Township of Middle Paxton 00 provides one of the few
examples where a challenger received a favorable decision in which
the agency determined that the environmental harm of a project
clearly outweighed its benefits. There, a township and citizens
group challenged DER's issuance of a permit for the construction of
a solid waste landfill. 101 In reversing DER's decision, the EHB,
while noting the first two Payne prongs had been satisfied, found
that the issuance of the permit failed under the final balancing
prong.10 2 In explaining the reasoning behind its decision, the Board
stated:
We have searched the record in [vain] for substantial evidence
indicating the benefits which will flow from this landfill. On
the other hand, the record is replete with fully detailed harmful
effects which can reasonably be anticipated by the [citizenry] if
we allow this permit to stand. . . . [The permittee] has sug-
gested that there is a present need for this landfill in Dauphin
County, but all of the evidence is to the contrary.103
Middle Paxton remains one of only two reported agency decisions
reaching such a conclusion on the third Payne prong.104
96. Id.
97. Twp. of Indiana, 1984 E.H.B. at 1.
98. Id. at 2, 31.
99. Id. at 31-36.
100. 1981 E.H.B. 315 (Pa.).
101. Id. at 315.
102. Id. at 333-41.
103. Id. at 339-40.
104. The other reported decision is Jefferson County Commissioners, 2002 E.H.B. 132
(Pa.), where the EHB applied a Pennsylvania solid waste statute balancing test (analogous
to Payne's third prong) to the DER's issuance of a solid waste permit, and found that the
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Forty years ago, in a concurrence to one of the earliest Common-
wealth Court decisions employing the Payne test, the late Judge
Harry A. Kramer-highlighting what he perceived to be woeful in-
adequacies of the test-provided the following clairvoyant assess-
ment:
The problem with a balancing test in this area of the law is that
no one can translate environmental harm into a dollar and
cents figure. In the absence of any prescribed standard to
weigh or value environmental harm, it is really impossible to
have a meaningful balancing test. I do not believe our balanc-
ing test is really anything more than a "shock the conscience of
the court test." In the absence of more precise standards or
guidelines, we can really do no more than proceed on a case-by-
case basis, and decide each case on the basis of whether or not
the proposed development offends our own personal ideas con-
cerning environmental values. Instead of applying any set law
or standards to these cases, we will merely be applying our own
personal standards (or biases) concerning environmental val-
ues.
1 0 5
While Judge Kramer appears to have been concerned with
environmentalists utilizing article I, section 27 to "harass and
perhaps even thwart what may be a perfectly legitimate
development, '" 10 6 it appears, from the subsequent forty years of
Payne-inspired jurisprudence, that the opposite result has come to
pass. Environmental challenges based on article I, section 27-
where the Payne test has been utilized-have hardly ever been
successful. Thus, in all but the most egregious cases where serious
environmental degradation is coupled with little to no economic or
social benefit, an aggrieved party has almost no chance of
successfully invoking article I, section 27 to challenge potentially
unconstitutional governmental action.
Of equal importance, there is little in these cases about the vin-
dication of public rights under article I of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, including the public right to have the government conserve
and maintain public natural resources, or a right against govern-
ment actions that interfere with clean air, pure water, or specified
environmental values. From case to case, one can search in vain for
environmental harm of the proposed landfill clearly outweighed its benefits. Jefferson Cnty.
Comm'rs, 2002 E.H.B. at 225-30.
105. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Commonwealth, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 335
A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (Kramer, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 866.
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constitutionally-based rules that are independent of the statutes
and regulations on which they are based. None of these cases even
resembles a constitutional law case. Instead, each case applies the
Payne test and its progeny, and not the text of article I, section 27.
III. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP V. COMMONWEALTH: RECOVERY OF
ARTICLE I, SECTION 27
The recovery of the Amendment's original meaning occurred on
December 19, 2013, in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth.10 7 In this
case, the court held unconstitutional several different provisions of
Act 13 of 2012-Marcellus Shale legislation.108 Chief Justice Cas-
tille authored a 162-page opinion on behalf of himself and two other
justices, based on article I, section 27.109 Justice Baer provided a
fourth vote for the unconstitutionality of these provisions, based on
substantive due process.110
As originally written, the Oil and Gas Act regulated conventional
oil and gas production, which ordinarily involves drilling vertically
to a concentration or pool of oil or gas located underground.1
Although it has been long known that shale strata existing
throughout Pennsylvania and other states contained gas, the gas
did not exist in pools in that shale.112 Rather, it was distributed
throughout the shale strata.11 3 The most prominent of these in
shale strata in Pennsylvania is known as Marcellus Shale.1 1 4 In
late 2004, in western Pennsylvania, the commercial feasibility of
extracting natural gas from Marcellus Shale was first
demonstrated.1 1 5 Although unconventional gas development is
often called "hydrofracturing," "fracking," or "fracing," it actually
involves a combination of techniques, including but not limited to
hydrofracturing.116 These techniques involve drilling vertically to
the shale layer but then horizontally through the shale to expose
107. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
108. 2012 Pa. Laws 87, No. 13, codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (amendments
to Oil and Gas Act).
109. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
110. Id. at 913.
111. Prior to Act 13, the last major revision of the state's oil and gas regulatory legislation
was in 1969, when the Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 601.101-601.607, was adopted.
112. Russell Bopp, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Pennsylvania's Oil and Gas Lease Act and
the Constitutionality of Forced Pooling, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 439, 442 (2014).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: How FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN ENERGY
REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD 227-28 (2014).
116. Bopp, supra note 112, at 442-44.
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more of the shale to the well bore, injecting large amounts of water
under pressure to shatter the shale and thus capture the gas
contained in the rock, and drilling multiple wells from the same
drilling pad.117  In less than a decade, unconventional gas
development has transformed much of Pennsylvania's economy and
landscape.
Act 13 is a comprehensive set of amendments to Pennsylvania's
Oil and Gas Act that was intended to accommodate and foster un-
conventional gas production.118 Shortly after it was signed into law,
Robinson Township and six other municipalities, two individuals,
an environmental organization, and a physician filed an action
against the state challenging Act 13 as inconsistent with article I,
section 27, substantive due process, and other provisions of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. In July 2013, the Commonwealth
Court dismissed most of these claims but held two provisions of Act
13 to be unconstitutional.11 9 In December 2013, Pennsylvania's Su-
preme Court held three separate provisions of Act 13 to be uncon-
stitutional.1 20
The Supreme Court's decision in Robinson Township changed the
legal landscape concerning article I, section 27 in many ways. It
did so by going back to its origins-analyzing the text, purpose, and
legislative history of the Environmental Rights Amendment. Chief
Justice Castille wrote:
The actions brought under Section 27 since its ratification...
have provided this Court with little opportunity to develop a
comprehensive analytical scheme based on the constitutional
provision. Moreover, it would appear that the jurisprudential
development in this area in the lower courts has weakened the
clear import of the plain language of the constitutional provi-
sion in unexpected ways. As a jurisprudential matter (and...
as a matter of substantive law), these precedents do not pre-
clude recognition and enforcement of the plain and original un-
derstanding of the Environmental Rights Amendment.121
Because of that review, Chief Justice Castille's opinion brought
to light several key points that had been more or less lost for
decades. To begin with, it recognized that article I, section 27 is
located in the Declaration of Rights in Pennsylvania's
117. Id. at 443-44.
118. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (amendments to Oil and Gas Act).
119. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
120. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
121. Id. at 950.
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Constitution-the state's equivalent of the U.S. Bill of Rights. The
plurality opinion, in other words, recognized for the first time in
decades what Franklin Kury had in mind when he first introduced
article I, section 27 in the State House of Representatives,
consciously placing the Amendment in article I, and stating that
environmental rights are "as vital to the good life-indeed to life
itself," as the other rights in the State's Declaration of Rights. 122
The environmental rights in section 27, the plurality said, "are on
par with, and enforceable to the same extent as, any other right
reserved to the people in Article J."123
In addition, the plurality understood article I, section 27 as a
limit on governmental authority, not simply as a grant of govern-
mental authority. It thus changed the framework with which
article I, section 27 has been treated since Gettysburg Tower.
Rights in article I, the plurality noted, are understood as inherent
rights that are reserved to the people; they operate as limits on gov-
ernment power.1 24 The plurality explained that the court had not
previously had an opportunity to address how article I, section 27
restrains the exercise of governmental regulatory power, and there-
fore "has had no opportunity to address the original understanding
of the constitutional provision."1 25
Using the history and text of article I, Chief Justice Castille de-
scribed article I rights, including those stated in section 27, as
rights that are "inherent" in the people.1 26 "Article I is the Com-
monwealth's Declaration of Rights, which delineates the terms of
the social contract between government and the people that are of
such 'general, great and essential' quality as to be ensconced as 'in-
violate.'1 27 Chief Justice Castille then stated: "The Declaration of
Rights assumes that the rights of the people articulated in Article I
of our Constitution-vis-'a-vis the government created by the peo-
ple-are inherent in man's nature and preserved rather than cre-
ated by the Pennsylvania Constitution."' 128 The rights contained in
section 27, then, are "[a]mong the inherent rights of the people of
Pennsylvania."1 29
122. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 953-54.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 964.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 947 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, pmbl, § 25).
128. Id. at 948 (citing Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533, 537 (1951)).
129. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948.
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Because article I rights operate as limits on governmental au-
thority, the plurality treated the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment as self-executing, citing the Commonwealth Court decision in
Gettysburg Tower.130 "The Commonwealth's obligations as trustee
to conserve and maintain the public natural resources for the ben-
efit of the people, including generations yet to come, create a right
in the people to seek to enforce the obligations."13 1 As the plurality
explained, constitutional provisions are self-executing when they
impose restrictions on the state, as article I, section 27 does.1 32 Ar-
ticle I rights have traditionally been held by Pennsylvania courts to
be self-executing.1 33 That makes perfect sense, because rights
would not be rights if the General Assembly's authorization was
needed to make them effective. No one could plausibly argue, for
instance, that the right to free speech depends on legislative author-
ization. In that regard, Chief Justice Castille's opinion treats sec-
tion 27 the same as every other provision in article I.
Moreover, this case was decided based upon the text of article I,
section 27 and traditional rules of constitutional interpretation. Re-
markably, as Part I of this Article explains, the actual text of the
Environmental Rights Amendment had not been taken seriously for
decades. Constitutional interpretation, the plurality said, must
begin with the plain language of article I, section 27 itself.1 34 As a
result, the plurality felt it necessary to explain what the text actu-
ally says: "The matter now before us offers appropriate circum-
stances to undertake the necessary explication of the Environmen-
tal Rights Amendment, including foundational matters. ''135
The first sentence establishes two rights in the people, Castille
wrote. The first is a right to "clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment."1 36 The second is "a limitation on the state's
power to act contrary to this right."1 37 The state as well as local gov-
ernments are bound by these rights, the plurality said. While the
state does not have a duty to enact laws to protect the right in this
first sentence, it does have a duty to "refrain from unduly infringing
130. Id. at 964-65, 964 n.52.
131. Id. at 974.
132. Id. at 974-75.
133. See, e.g., Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79 (1903).
134. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 943 (citing Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 939 (Pa.
2006); Ieropoli v. AC & S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 2004)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 951.
137. Id.
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upon or violating the right, including by legislative enactment or
executive action."138
The second and third sentences, the plurality wrote, involve a
public trust. "Public natural resources are owned in common by the
people, including future generations." 139 The state's constitutional
public trust responsibility applies to all "public natural resources,"
whether they are owned by the state or held in common law trust. 140
As noted in the introduction to this Article, the drafters of article I,
section 27 left open the definition of "public natural resources. '141
The plurality nonetheless ventured a current list: "At present, the
concept of public natural resources includes not only state-owned
lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that im-
plicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and ground
water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the
scope of purely private property. '142
Because the state is the trustee of these resources, it has a fidu-
ciary duty to "conserve and maintain" them. 143 "The plain meaning
of the terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty to prevent
and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public
natural resources." 144 The state has two separate obligations as
trustee. First, "the Commonwealth has a duty to refrain from per-
mitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of
public natural resources, whether such degradation, diminution, or
depletion would occur through direct state action or indirectly, e.g.,
because of the state's failure to restrain the actions of private par-
ties. ' 145 The second is a duty "to act affirmatively to protect the
environment, via legislative action. 146
138. Id. at 952; see also id. at 953 ("The benchmark for decision is the express purpose of
the Environmental Rights Amendment to be a bulwark against actual or likely degradation
of, inter alia, our air and water quality.").
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 955.
142. Id.; see also id. at 975 ("The public natural resources implicated by the 'optimal' ac-
commodation of industry here are resources essential to life, health, and liberty: surface and
ground water, ambient air, and aspects of the natural environment in which the public has
an interest."). The legislative history reinforces that understanding. See, e.g., H. JOURNAL,
1970 Reg. Sess., at 2271-72 (Pa. 1970), in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 30-31 ("This trusteeship applies to resources owned by the Commonwealth and
also to those resources not owned by the Commonwealth, which involve a public interest.").
143. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 952.
144. Id. at 957.
145. Id. at 958.
146. Id.
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In light of this explication of the text of article I, section 27, the
plurality criticized the Payne v. Kassab test. As Chief Justice Cas-
tille explained, "the Payne test appears to have become, for the
Commonwealth Court, the benchmark for section 27 decisions in
lieu of the constitutional text. '147 The Supreme Court in Payne, he
explained, "did not adopt that test but noted that the standard was
equivalent to appellate review" of the challenged decision under the
applicable statute.148 He then explained the flaws in the Payne test:
[W]hile the Payne test may have answered a call for guidance
on substantive standards in this area of law and may be rela-
tively easy to apply, the test poses difficulties both obvious and
critical. First, the Payne test describes the Commonwealth's
obligations-both as trustee and under the first clause of Sec-
tion 27-in much narrower terms than the constitutional pro-
vision. Second, the test assumes that the availability of judi-
cial relief premised upon Section 27 is contingent upon and con-
strained by legislative action. And, finally, the Commonwealth
Court's Payne decision and its progeny have the effect of mini-
mizing the constitutional duties of executive agencies and the
judicial branch, and circumscribing the abilities of these enti-
ties to carry out their constitutional duties independent of leg-
islative control. 149
Chief Justice Castille's plurality opinion was also the first time
that article I, section 27 had ever been used-even by a plurality-
to hold a statute unconstitutional. In this case, three different pro-
visions were held unconstitutional. Section 3303 declares that state
environmental laws "occupy the entire field" of oil and gas regula-
tion, "to the exclusion of all local ordinances.1 50 Section 3303 also
"preempts and supersedes the local regulation of oil and gas opera-
tions" regulated under the state's various environmental laws.1 51
The Commonwealth is the trustee under the Amendment, which
means that local governments are among the trustees with consti-
tutional responsibilities.1 52 Section 3303, the plurality stated, vio-
147. Id. at 966. "In its subsequent applications, the Commonwealth Court has indicated
that the viability of constitutional claims premised upon the Environmental Rights Amend-
ment was limited by whether the General Assembly had acted and by the General Assembly's
policy choices, rather than by the plain language of the amendment." Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 965.
149. Id. at 966-67.
150. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303.
151. Id.
152. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977-78.
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lates article I, section 27 "because the General Assembly has no au-
thority to remove a political subdivision's implicitly necessary au-
thority to carry into effect its constitutional duties. 153
Section 3304 requires "all local ordinances regulating oil and gas
operations" to "allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas
resources. 154 In so doing, it imposes uniform rules for unconven-
tional gas development in the state, prohibits local governments
from establishing more stringent rules, establishes limited time pe-
riods for local review of drilling proposals, and imposes uniform
rules for oil and gas regulation. Section 3304, the plurality con-
cluded, violates article I, section 27 for two reasons. "First, a new
regulatory regime permitting industrial uses as a matter of right in
every type of pre-existing zoning district [including residential] is
incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-pro-
tected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of
life. '11 55 Second, under Act 13 "some properties and communities
will carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens
than others. '1 56 This result, the plurality stated, is inconsistent
with the obligation that the trustee act for the benefit of "all the
people."1 57
Finally, Section 3215(b) prohibits drilling or disturbing area
within specific distances of streams, springs, wetlands, and other
water bodies.158 But Section 3215(b)(4) requires DEP to waive these
distance restrictions if the permit applicant submits "additional
measures, facilities or practices" that it will employ to protect these
waters. 159 This provision, the plurality stated, violates article I, sec-
tion 27 because the legislation "does not provide any ascertainable
standards by which public natural resources are to be protected if
an oil and gas operator seeks a waiver. 1 60 In addition "[i]f an ap-
plicant appeals permit terms or conditions ... Section 3215 remark-
ably places the burden on [DEP] to 'prov[e] that the conditions were
necessary to protect against a probable harmful impact of [sic] the
public resources."'161 Because Section 3215 prevents anyone other
than the applicant from appealing a permit condition, it also "mar-
ginalizes participation by residents, business owners, and their
153. Id. at 977.
154. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304.
155. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979.
156. Id. at 980.
157. Id.
158. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215.
159. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4).
160. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 983.
161. Id. at 984.
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elected representatives with environmental and habitability con-
cerns, whose interests Section 3215 ostensibly protects." 16 2
Justice Baer's concurring opinion focused on the same disruptive
aspects of Act 13 to citizens and their environment. Requiring all
municipalities to adopt the same buffer zones for specific shale gas
facilities, regardless of local circumstances, without any ability by
the municipality to make the distances in these buffer zones more
protective, "and without any available mechanism for objection or
remedy by the citizenry consistent with the individualized concerns
of each municipality, zoning district, or resident, is the epitome of
arbitrary and discriminatory impact." 16 3 He nonetheless anchored
his view of the unconstitutionality of Act 13 on substantive due pro-
cess, which he regarded as "better developed and a narrower ave-
nue to resolve this appeal."1 6 4 The challenged provisions, he said,
"force municipalities to enact zoning ordinances" that "violate the
substantive due process rights of their citizenries. 16 5 There were
two dissenting opinions.166
Nonetheless, as the Commonwealth Court explained in a later
case, "it does not appear that any of the concurring and dissenting
justices disputed the plurality's construction of the Environmental
Rights Amendment, including the rights declared therein and at-
tendant duties imposed thereby on the Commonwealth."16 7 Indeed,
Justice Baer described the plurality opinion as "thorough, well-con-
sidered, and able;" he also stated that it was "pioneering."16 8 Justice
Eakin, in dissent, described it as "thoughtful."16 9
The Robinson Township case, and particularly Chief Justice Cas-
tille's plurality opinion, is already being described as a landmark
decision.1 70 The case is spawning an already-significant number of
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1007.
164. Id. at 1001.
165. Id. at 1008.
166. Justice Saylor stated that Act 13 provides a detailed system for regulating unconven-
tional gas development, that the legislature "occupies the primary fiduciary role" under arti-
cle I, section 27, and that local governments have no "vested entitlement" to "dictate the
manner in which the General Assembly administers the Commonwealth's fiduciary obliga-
tion to the citizenry at large relative to the environment." Id. at 1012. Justice Eakin's dissent
expressed concern that the decision empowers municipalities at the expense of state decision-
making authority. Id. at 1015. 'Viunicipalities certainly have the power to manage land use,
but such power is given by the legislature, not the Constitution." Id.
167. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Corbett, 108 A.3d 140, 156 n.37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
168. Robinson Twp, 83 A.3d at 1000, 1001.
169. Id. at 1014.
170. See, e.g., ION Geophysical Corp. v. Hempfield Twp., Civ. No. 14-410, 2014 WL
1405397, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2014).
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articles and commentaries. 171 Professor Mary Wood of the Univer-
sity of Oregon Law School, who has published a well-reviewed book
about the public trust doctrine, 172 has described Chief Justice Cas-
tille's opinion as "a transformative opinion," adding that it
''amounts to the most detailed judicial iteration of the public trust
obligation ever rendered.1' 73 The opinion is influencing lawyers and
policy makers in Pennsylvania, in other states, and around the
world.
IV. CONCLUSION
To be very sure, plurality opinions do not create binding prece-
dent. A future decision by a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will be needed for that. Still, the plurality opinion is likely to
have significant persuasive power, in no small part because it con-
tains a lengthy, detailed, and thoughtful exposition of the original
meaning and understanding of article I, section 27. The opinion
reflects a deep understanding of Pennsylvania constitutional law
and enormous respect for the purpose, text, legislative history, and
meaning of article I, section 27. On the night the opinion was is-
sued, one of the authors (Prof. Dernbach) spoke with Franklin
Kury, who championed article I, section 27. "In terms of what we
intended," Kury said, Chief Justice Castille "really got it right."1 74
As a result of this opinion, Pennsylvanians will almost certainly be
able to count on reinvigorated judicial protection of their environ-
mental rights for generations to come. And for that, we can all
thank Chief Justice Castille.
171. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, James R. May, & Kenneth Kristl, Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications, RUTGERS U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2412657;
John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, ENVTL. L. (forth-
coming 2015); Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson Township: A Model for Environmental
Constitutionalism, WIDENER L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2442367; Joshua P. Fershee, Facts, Fiction, and
Perception in Hydraulic Fracturing: Illuminating Act 13 and Robinson Township v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 819 (2014).
172. MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE'S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014).
173. E-mail from Mary Wood, Philip H. Knight Professor of Law and Faculty Director,
Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program, University of Oregon School of Law, to
John Dernbach (Oct. 5, 2014, 11:28:20 AM EDT) (on file with Prof. Dernbach).
174. E-mail from Franklin Kury to John Dernbach (June 8, 2015, 5:50 PM EDT) (on file
with Prof. Dernbach).
Summer 2015 359
Duquesne Law Review
APPENDIX A
REPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS APPLYING THE PAYNE V. KASSAB
TEST
In the following twenty-three decisions, the court applied or con-
sidered the three-part Payne v. Kassab test as a substitute for the
text of the constitution, and decided the case against the challeng-
ing party. See Energy Conservation Council of Pa. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 25 A.3d 440 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (affirming utility com-
mission's approval of construction of high voltage power line and
substation, and finding commission's approval process satisfied
Payne obligations); Blue Mountain Pres. Ass'n v. Twp. of Eldred,
867 A.2d 692 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (denying conservation groups'
constitutional challenge to race track construction on land adjacent
to Appalachian Trail, and concluding that even though lower re-
viewing court "did not specifically articulate a Payne analysis," it
was "satisfied" that the requirements of Payne were undertaken
and met); Szarko v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 668 A.2d 1232 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (affirming Environmental Hearing Board's
(EHB) determination that landfill operator's compliance with rele-
vant statutes meant compliance with article I, section 27, and
EHB's Payne test conclusion that benefits of landfill outweigh po-
tential environmental harm); Concerned Residents of the Yough,
Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 639 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
(affirming Department of Environmental Resources' (DER) issu-
ance of permit for construction of hazardous waste facility despite
leakage from similarly situated and owned facility, and denying
that DER failed to give meaningful consideration to quiet enjoy-
ment and aesthetics by concluding that EHB properly found DER
had considered quality of life and aesthetics in its permit review
based on DER employee testimony that noise and aesthetics were
considered as required by relevant regulation, despite that same
employee testifying that no relevant regulation contained rules or
standards for noise or aesthetics); O'Connor v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 582 A.2d 427 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (upholding exemp-
tion from local zoning laws provided to private company by public
utility commission for construction of electrical substation, finding
Historical and Museum Commission's determinations were advi-
sory and thus not binding on other agencies for first Payne prong,
and omitting any balancing of project's benefit against environmen-
tal harm as required by third prong); Del-AWARE Unlimited, Inc.
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 513 A.2d 593 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
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(summarily dismissing citizens' group claim that public utility com-
mission failed to adhere to Payne requirements in approval of con-
struction of private pumping station in public park, and concluding
in footnote that commission had "adequately considered the aes-
thetic effects" of project by relying on private company's statement
that "attractiveness" was considered in its building construction
and that company "would mulch"); Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors
v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res., 513 A.2d 508 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986) (affirming DER's approval of construction of sewage treat-
ment plant at a particular site, finding EHB's Payne analysis satis-
factory, and concluding benefits of the project "unquestionably out-
weigh the environmental harm and adverse effects, if any"); Com-
monwealth, Pa. Game Comm'n v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl.
Res., 509 A.2d 877 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (upholding DER's issu-
ance of permit for solid waste landfill, and, after review of record,
affirming EHB's Payne analysis and permit approval); Del-AWARE
Unlimited, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res., 508 A.2d
348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (denying citizens' group challenge to
construction of pumping station in public park to supply water to
nuclear facility, which challengers claimed DER approved without
evaluating deleterious aesthetic effects on park and nearby historic
district in violation of Payne mandate, and holding DER was free to
rely on reviews from other agencies that found "pumping station
would be compatible with the park and historic district"); Pa. Envtl.
Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res., 503 A.2d
477 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (remanding DER's denial of landfill per-
mit for improper application of third Payne prong when DER lim-
ited benefit of landfill project analysis to proposed site instead of
entire region, and considered the unsuitability of a proposed site in
benefit rather than harm-to-environment portion of analysis); In re
Waltos' Condemnation, 29 Pa. D. & C.3d 429 (C.P. Somerset Cnty.
1983) (dismissing landowners' preliminary objections to borough's
condemnation of property to construct new sewage pipeline, which
would drain into and pollute nearby waterway, due to landowners'
failure to submit evidence of waterway pollution or the feasibility
of an alternate plan, both of which court asserted were required for
Payne test); Montgomery Cnty. v. A.J.S. Enters., Inc., 18 Pa. D. &
C.3d 507 (C.P. Montgomery Cnty. 1981) (finding Payne standards
satisfied and dismissing landowner's objections to taking of private
land for use as a solid waste dump, and holding environmental ben-
efits derived from landowner's current use of property for recycling
purposes irrelevant for determining environmental impact of chal-
lenged action in third Payne prong); Swartwood v. Commonwealth,
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Dep't of Envtl. Res., 424 A.2d 993 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (affirming
EHB's approval of township's decision to supplement sewage facili-
ties plan to allow for construction of new housing development, and
finding all three Payne standards satisfied by record and EHB's
analysis); Appeal of Spory, 419 A.2d 804 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(affirming lower court's approval of plan for roadway despite appel-
lant's contention that township chose more environmentally harm-
ful option, and finding township's decision satisfied Payne stand-
ards and was not arbitrary); Mignatti Constr. Co. v. Common-
wealth, Envtl. Hearing Bd., 411 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(denying township's claim that DER's approval of quarry construc-
tion project violated article I, section 27, finding record established
that DER satisfied Payne standards, and making its own third-
prong determination-rather than deciding whether DER abused
its discretion-that "benefits of quarry are substantial and out-
weigh the environmental harm which will result from [its] construc-
tion"); Concerned Citizens for Orderly Progress v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Envtl. Res., 387 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (per cu-
riam) (denying appeal of approval of sewer and sewage plant con-
struction project despite both DER and EHB admitting failure to
balance environmental harms of project against social and economic
benefits, and performing de novo Payne analysis from record in or-
der to affirm project approval); In re Legislative Route 58018, 375
A.2d 1364 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (reversing the lower court's deci-
sion sustaining landowner's preliminary objections that condemna-
tion for public road project had not satisfied Payne requirements,
finding statute applied by lower court for first Payne prong did not
pertain to the project and thus state was not subject to statute's
numerous environmental considerations, and concluding-based on
record-that state had satisfied second and third Payne prongs);
Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976)
(after reciting the three-prong Payne standard, the court granted
demurrer on an article I, section 27 challenge to road modification
by finding particular statute does not apply to disputed project, con-
cluding that the first Payne prong is satisfied because state is not
required to consider factors beyond those mandated by relevant
statutes, ignoring second and third Payne prongs, and affirming
project approval); Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Precision
Tube Co., 358 A.2d 137 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (affirming DER's
approval of proposed expressway cross-over project requiring con-
struction of culverts and alteration of creek's natural channel, and
finding that, while the project "will necessarily involve some harm
to the natural and scenic area," DER did not abuse its discretion by
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concluding benefits outweighed harm); Cmty. Coll. of Del. Cnty. v.
Fox, 342 A.2d 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (reversing decision of
EHB, in which EHB had vacated approval of sewer line construc-
tion for failure to fully consider environmental impact, holding EHB
could not apply additional criteria beyond that provided by relevant
statute(s) indicated in first prong of Payne analysis, finding record
thus satisfied first prong requirements, and concluding-in two
sentences with little to no analysis-that the second and third
Payne prongs were also met); Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Res.
v. Commonwealth, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 335 A.2d 860 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975) (holding that when an article I, section 27 chal-
lenge is brought, state agency decision-making process or judicial
review must meet Payne requirements, but still finding from record
utility commission's approval of power line project-despite failing
to analyze Payne standards-satisfied Payne's requirements); In re
Condemnation of Right-of-Way, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 215 (C.P. Chester
Cnty. 1975) (holding that landowners challenging a state road pro-
ject had burden to show adverse environmental impact, and finding
state had no affirmative duty under article I, section 27 to assess
environmental impact of its activity); Bucks Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
v. Commonwealth, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 313 A.2d 185 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (denying an article I, section 27 challenge to oil
pipeline construction, and-while noting commission did not have
opportunity to use the recently enumerated Payne test due to date
of commission's initial decision-concluding that the commission
properly determined "the need for energy outweighed the indicated
injury to the environment");
For the lone reported case where government action failed the
Payne v. Kassab test, see Marcon, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of
Envtl. Res., 462 A.2d 969 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (affirming the
EHB's decision to set aside permit issued by DER that would au-
thorize discharge of sewage effluent into high quality waterway,
noting EHB's decision was based on, inter alia, article I, section 27
and correctly-applied Payne analysis, of which the proposed project
failed all three prongs).
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APPENDIX B
REPORTED ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL DECISIONS APPLYING THE
PAYNE V. KASSAB TEST
There are forty-seven reported decisions by administrative
tribunals applying or considering the Payne v. Kassab test as a
substitute for the constitutional text, and deciding the case against
the challenging party. These are: Brockway Borough Mun. Auth.,
No. 2013-080-L (Pa. E.H.B. Apr. 24, 2015) (dismissing water
authority's appeal of DEP's issuance of permit for unconventional
gas well to be drilled on existing well pad); PPL Elec. Util. Corp.,
Nos. A-2012-2340872 (Pa. P.U.C. Jan. 9, 2014) (approving siting
and construction of high voltage transmission lines and two
substation control buildings, as well as twenty-three eminent
domain applications); PPL Elec. Util. Corp., Nos. A-2011-2267349
(Pa. P.U.C. July 16, 2013) (reversing two denials of PPL's eminent
domain applications to construct high voltage transmission line
after granting nearly all PPL's exceptions); Pa. Elec. Co., Nos. A-
2011-2247862 (Pa. P.U.C. June 7, 2012) (approving siting and
construction of a six-mile high voltage transmission line); PPL Elec.
Util. Corp., Nos. A-2010-2152104 (Pa. P.U.C. Mar. 17, 2011)
(approving construction of a high voltage transmission line and
substation control building, as well as easement condemnation for
transmission line corridor); Duquesne Light Co., No. A-2010-
2159814 (Pa. P.U.C. Feb. 10, 2011) (approving siting and
construction of an eight-mile high voltage transmission line); PPL
Elec. Util. Corp., Nos. A-2009-2082652 (Pa. P.U.C. Jan. 14, 2010)
(approving construction of a 101-mile high voltage transmission
line and substation control building, as well as multiple
condemnations for transmission line corridor); PPL Elec. Util.
Corp., Nos. A-2008-2022941 (Pa. P.U.C. July 24, 2009) (approving
construction of high voltage transmission line, construction of
substation control building, and condemnation of five separate
properties for transmission line corridor); Del. Riverkeeper, 2004
E.H.B. 599 (Pa.) (affirming DEP's approval of the construction of a
central sewage treatment plant and effluent discharge into
Delaware River); William A. Smedley, 2001 E.H.B. 131 (Pa.)
(affirming approval by Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP-formerly DER) of modification to air quality permits to allow
for tire-derived fuel to be burned to generate electricity at paper
mill); Green Thornbury Comm., 1995 E.H.B. 636 (Pa.) (dismissing
appeals from DER's approval of revision to official sewage facilities
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plan that allowed for single residence stream discharge systems);
Montgomery Twp., 1995 E.H.B. 483 (Pa.) (affirming DER's order for
municipality to revise its official sewage facilities plan to allow for
spray irrigation sewage facility, and concluding that, even if DER
did not perform third prong balancing, because challengers failed
to provide specific evidence of environmental harm from project, the
Board "must conclude there are no environmental costs from this
project and any balancing of the interests would weigh in favor of
allowing the project to proceed."); Jay Twp., 1994 E.H.B. 1724 (Pa.)
(denying an article I, section 27 challenge to a permit issued to
construct and operate residual waste landfill on site of an
unreclaimed strip mine, holding that compliance with Solid Waste
Management Act satisfies constitutional requirements for any
actions taken pursuant to SWMA); Lower Windsor Twp., 1993
E.H.B. 1305 (Pa.) (affirming DER's issuance of permit modification
for seventeen-acre expansion of solid waste landfill); Residents
Opposed to Black Bridge Incinerator (ROBBI), 1993 E.H.B. 675
(Pa.) (dismissing appeal of DER's air quality plan approval for trash
incinerator, and performing its own third prong balancing to find
that environmental harm "does not clearly outweigh the benefits"
of plan approval); Loraine Andrews, 1993 E.H.B. 548 (Pa.)
(affirming DER's approval of the township's revision of official
sewage plan to allow for construction of new housing development
adjacent to historic and scenic area); Morton Kise, 1992 E.H.B. 1580
(Pa.) (affirming DER's approval of the township's revision of the
official sewage plan to permit on-site sewage disposal, admitting
DER did not analyze the third Payne prong, and performing sua
sponte balancing that found environmental harm to be "de minimis
or nonexistent" and thus outweighed by project's benefits); W. Pa.
Water Co., 1991 E.H.B. 287 (Pa.) (affirming DER's issuance of
permit for additional allocations from two waterways, and noting
that agency was empowered to impose conditions on permit
pursuant to DER's obligations under article I, section 27); Bobbi L.
Fuller, 1990 E.H.B. 1726 (Pa.) (dismissing appeals of DER issuance
of permits for sewage treatment plant construction, and omitting
any discussion of third Payne prong from analysis); Easton Area
Joint Sewer Auth., 1990 E.H.B. 1307 (Pa.) (upholding DER issuance
of permit for sewage treatment facility and sewage effluent
discharge into high-quality cold water fishery); T.R.A.S.H., LTD.,
1989 E.H.B. 487 (Pa.) (affirming DER issuance of solid waste
permit, air quality plan approval, and pollutant discharge permit,
and stating "[a]s for the Payne analysis, we have determined that
all relevant statutes have been complied with, that [applicant] has
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reduced environmental incursion to a minimum, and that any
environmental harm which will result will be outweighed by the
benefits"); Gerald W. Wyant, 1988 E.H.B. 986 (Pa.) (affirming DER
issuance of permit for sewage treatment facility and effluent
discharge into cold water fishery, and concluding-without any
analysis of second or third Payne prongs-that DER "properly
carried out its duties under Article I, Section 27" because challenger
failed to establish noncompliance with statutes or regulations);
York Cnty. Solid Waste & Refuse Auth., 1988 E.H.B. 373 (Pa.)
(denying reconsideration of DER approval for landfill expansion,
and concluding DER's evaluation satisfied Payne's requirements);
Floyd & Janet Keim, 1985 E.H.B. 63 (Pa.) (affirming approval of
township's revision of its official sewage facilities plan to permit
inclusion of proposed 351-dwelling development into the municipal
sewer system); Twp. of Concord, 1985 E.H.B. 32 (Pa.) (affirming
DER's order for township to revise its official sewage facilities plan
to permit construction of individual package plant for sewage
treatment on a private lot); Twp. of Indiana, 1984 E.H.B. 1 (Pa.)
(affirming DER issuance of permit for facility to process byproducts
of coal-burning power plant, and holding challengers have burden
to show environmental harm outweighs the benefits); Coolspring
Twp., 1983 E.H.B. 151 (Pa.) (affirming DER issuance of a permit for
disposal of sewage sludge on farmland, and holding that
challengers have burden to show environmental harm outweighs
the benefits); Pa. Mines Corp., 1982 E.H.B. 407 (Pa.) (refusing to
apply the Payne test to DER issuance of permit to drill a natural
gas well on private property); E. Arthur Thompson, 1980 E.H.B. 224
(Pa.) (affirming DER's approval of sewage treatment facility that
would discharge into local waterway, and concluding that because
it was technologically possible for sewage effluent to be treated, and
because challengers did not prove project would cause
environmental damage, "there is no need to minimize the
environmental incursion or to balance the environmental damage
against [the] social benefit."); Eugene Scobel, 1980 E.H.B. 430 (Pa.)
(denying supersedeas petition to stay DER's issuance of mine
drainage permit); Andorra Nurseries, Inc., 1980 E.H.B. 153 (Pa.)
(affirming DER's approval of sewage and water permits for
construction of large conference facility, and concluding Payne
analysis by stating "the impact of the sewer line and the resulting
effluent will be negligible, while the social and economic benefits of
a large well planned new conference and training facility will be of
significant benefit to the entire area in both aesthetic and
commercial terms"); Application of Phila. Suburban Water Co., No.
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99126 (Pa. P.U.C. Apr. 11, 1980) (denying protests and issuing
certificate of necessity for construction of 5-million-gallon steel
water reservoir and pumping station in area zoned for farming and
residential uses); Concerned Citizens of Breakneck Valley, 1979
E.H.B. 201 (Pa.) (finding DER's approval of construction of new
chemical plant for military weapons proper under article I, section
27, but remanding to DER to consider effects of increased
production on existing chemical plant and to require chemical
company to install device to measure certain toxic chemical
byproduct); Edward S. Swartz, 1979 E.H.B. 144 (Pa.) (affirming
DER's approval of a surface mining permit-including blasting-on
land adjacent to local historic cavern formation, and concluding
that approval does not violate article I, section 27); Wrightstown
Twp., 1977 E.H.B. 312 (Pa.) (upholding approval of surface mining
permit after referencing three-prong Payne test but only analyzing
first prong concerning statutory compliance); Pa. Power & Light
Co., Nos. 97266-71 (Pa. P.U.C. Jan. 20, 1977) (affirming approval
of electric transmission line construction and proposed exercise of
eminent domain); Pa. Council of Trout Unlimited, 1976 E.H.B. 340
(Pa.) (affirming DER's issuance of a strip mining drainage permit
for discharge into high quality streams adjacent to state park after
performing full Payne analysis and concluding all prongs satisfied);
Mrs. Merle Kohl, 1976 E.H.B. 242 (Pa.) (affirming DER's issuance
of permits for expansion of solid waste landfill and industrial waste
discharge, performing no Payne third prong balancing but
concluding that "[article I, section 27] is satisfied by the issuance of
these permits"); W. Pa. Conservancy, 1976 E.H.B. 190 (Pa.)
(affirming DER's sewer permit approval for enlargement of
vacation housing development, and finding DER had no
responsibility to perform third Payne prong balancing, nor ability
to consider the environmental effect of the project on adjacent
public park land under DER control, because locus in quo was
private property); Cnty. of Montgomery, 1975 E.H.B. 369 (Pa.)
(denying appeal of multiple permit approvals for oil pipeline
spanning five counties, and concluding, without any analysis, that
DER's actions "adequately protected the interests expressed in
Article I, Section 27"); Dolores M. Gondos, 1975 E.H.B. 223 (Pa.)
(affirming DER approval of multiple permits for coal mine refuse
dump after applying Payne test); Robert L. Anthony, 1975 E.H.B.
149 (Pa.) (affirming DER approval of erosion and sedimentation
permit for shopping mall construction project, but remanding to
DER to develop long-term waterway monitoring plan); Oaks Civic
Ass'n, 1975 E.H.B. 123 (Pa.) (affirming DER approval of sewage
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treatment plant expansion, and limiting the extent of Payne
analysis to conclusion that "applying the principles enunciated in
[Payne v. Kassab], DER's decision appears to be eminently
justified"); Summit Twp. Taxpayers Ass'n, 1975 E.H.B. 99 (Pa.)
(addressing article I, section 27 implications sua sponte, performing
Payne analysis but only cursory treatment of second and third
prongs, and affirming DER approval of solid waste landfill permit);
Souders & Souders, 1975 E.H.B. 21 (Pa.) (holding that challengers
have burden of proof to show article I, section 27 violation, and
affirming issuance of surface mining permit after full Payne
analysis); Greene Twp. Supervisors, 1974 E.H.B. 468 (Pa.)
(affirming DER permit approval for sewage plant construction and
effluent discharge into local tributary despite established and
potential regulatory violations by applicant, performing no Payne
analysis of DER's decision, and holding challenger had burden of
proof to show breach of trust under article I, section 27);
Chesterbrook Conservancy, 1974 E.H.B. 406 (Pa.) (upholding soil
and erosion permit approval for the first stage of 800-acre
development plan, and referencing Payne but applying none of its
standards in reviewing approval).
For the eight administrative agency adjudications with outcomes
that could be considered favorable for the challenging party, see the
following: Jefferson Cnty. Comm'rs, 2002 E.H.B. 132 (Pa.) (revoking
DEP's issuance of solid waste landfill permit after finding, among
multiple statutory and regulatory violations, need for landfill was
outweighed by harm, in contravention of Pennsylvania waste regu-
lation incorporating need-versus-harm analysis analogous to third
Payne prong); Al Hamilton Contracting Co., 1992 E.H.B. 1458 (Pa.)
(affirming DER's denial of surface mining permit, concluding DER
need not analyze second and third Payne prongs when clear viola-
tions of applicable regulations, in contravention of first prong, were
present); Mr. & Mrs. John Korgeski, 1991 E.H.B. 935 (Pa.) (revers-
ing DER's permit modification-regarding approach and access
routes to landfill-that was contingent upon completion of a study
of route feasibility, holding Payne requires analysis of impact and
balancing of harm versus benefit before such approval can be
given); Edward Wayne Butz, 1981 E.H.B. 68 (Pa.) (modifying DER
sewer extension permit by limiting it to only residences experienc-
ing sewer problems, as required by second Payne prong to minimize
environmental incursion); Twp. of Middle Paxton, 1981 E.H.B. 315
(Pa.) (reversing DER's issuance of permit for solid waste landfill af-
ter finding substantial environmental harm of proposed landfill
greatly outweighed putative benefits); Doris J. Baughman, 1979
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E.H.B. 1 (Pa.) (remanding approval of new coal cleaning plant pro-
ject to DER for failure of second Payne prong and failing to balance
environmental harm with social and economic benefits as required
by third prong, but concluding benefits of continued interim opera-
tion of old plant outweighed environmental harm); Penn's Woods
W. Chapter of Trout Unlimited, 1977 E.H.B. 48 (Pa.) (finding DER
failed second Payne prong in surface coal mine permit approval pro-
cess, but nonetheless affirming issuance of permit with modifica-
tion of reduction in mine discharge iron concentration); Paul K. Mil-
ler Mobile Home Park, 1974 E.H.B. 342 (Pa.) (remanding to DER to
perform proper Payne v. Kassab analysis of the proposed sewer
plant project and its feasible alternatives).

